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We propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally
sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and
their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial
commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which
agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are non-
monotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and
demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model
helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved dicult to explain with available theories.
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A large set of activities are characterized by externally sanctioned prohibitions. These include not
only formally illegal or criminal behaviors, which are sanctioned by law, but also, for instance,
economic or social relationships which are constrained by norms of conduct and are subject to
social sanctions. A common feature of external sanctions is that they are typically delayed in
time and uncertain, since they are contingent upon detection and punishment. We consider the
possibility that agents with self-control problems may be tempted to break prohibitions by the
immediate returns yielded by deviation, although they understand that it does not pay o in
the long run, once expected sanctions are taken into account. Prohibitions may also be subject
to internalized moral sanctions, however. These are not in
icted by external parties but are
associated to the experience of negative (self-regulative) emotions like guilt. Unlike external
punishments, the utility costs associated to infringement of moral prescriptions can be suered
immediately upon act or even desire.
Most cultures (and religions) explicitly attach moral sanctions to many prohibited, and of-
ten formally illegal, actions. For instance, the Bible features commandments against theft and
adultery, and analogous religious or moral prescriptions can be found in dierent cultures. The
Bible does not only prohibit theft and adultery, however, but also the desire of other people's
goods and wife.1 In fact, as discussed in more detail in Section 2, the existence of temptation
problems in association to prohibited actions appears a relevant, or even pervasive, problem. The
link between prohibitions, temptations and moral values has, however, essentially been neglected
in economics.2
In this paper, we propose a theory of prohibitions, temptation and moral values investigating
the idea that moral values may serve the role of self-control devices. In the model, temptation
results from immediate urges at the moment of action, which may induce payo dominated
choices and can be resisted by exerting costly self-control. Agents would be better o if they
could exclude all tempting options from their choice set. While in practice this may not be
1The commandment against actions is: `You shall not commit adultery. You shall not steal.' (Exodus, 20:12).
The prohibition of desire is: You shall not covet your neighbor's house; you shall not covet your neighbor's wife,
nor his male servant, nor his female servant, nor his ox, nor his donkey, nor anything that is your neighbor's.'
(Exodus, 20:13). The title of this paper comes from the ancient English version of this commandment.
2We discuss the existing evidence and related theoretical literature in Section 2.
1feasible, tempting options can be made individually more costly. We propose the view that this
is precisely one of the possible roles of moral values: they can serve as a `partial' commitment
device.3 After characterizing exposure to temptation in presence of heterogenous returns to the
prohibited actions, we study individual incentives to adhere to a moral code sanctioning those
actions and their desire. Specically, we frame the problem in terms of individual choices between
a legal and an illegal (or criminal) action.4 While this is relevant per se and helps drive intuition,
the applicability of the theory is wider.
Despite its simplicity, the model delivers several insights. Tempted agents face a trade-o
between the costs of self-control and the payo costs of giving in to temptation. By attaching
guilt costs to prohibited actions, moral values modify this trade-o and (can) allow to resist
temptation. To increase utility, though, morality must sanction both actions and desires. The
model highlights two potential sources of temptation: attraction by immediate returns, which
can operate even in the absence of any morality, and morality itself. Subtly, moral prohibitions
have therefore both the potential to alleviate temptation and to induce in temptation.
Morality imposes a trade-o. It saves on self-control costs, but it may also prevent to take
advantage of high return illegal opportunities and it exposes agents to the cost of guilt in case
they do not resist temptations. Adhering to a system of moral values (or receiving an eective
moral education) is therefore benecial only for those expecting to face temptation and, more
importantly, expecting to resist it in equilibrium. The model therefore provides an answer to the
question of why individuals would voluntarily adhere to a moral code that may involve utility
costs. With heterogeneous returns, if crime premia are either very low (possibly negative) or
very high, then legality and crime, respectively, are the unequivocally optimal choices (from an
individual point of view) so that no temptation problems arise. Individuals with intermediate
crime premia are those who benet the most from moral values. The model further predicts
that for most tempted individuals it is optimal to adhere to moral values if and only if these are
suciently strict.5 The reason is that a weak morality would not be sucient to resist temptation,
3While changing own moral values to avoid experiencing guilt appears possible, this is generally a long, and
often hard, process. It is reasonable to assume that moral values are stable over the shorter time horizon of the
exposure to the urges of temptation.
4We use henceforth crime and illegality as synonyms, without any further distinction.
5For instance, if crime premia were decreasing in socio-economic status, the middle class would be the one that
mostly gains from morality, with the lower-middle class being morally stricter than the upper-middle class.
2and it would only add the cost of guilt to that of forgone payos (in this sense morality is a risky
asset).
The model allows to study the interaction between external and internal sanctions. While legal
(or social) enforcement reduces crime, it also raises self-control problems and correspondingly
increases the scope for moral values of honesty.6 So legal (or social) and moral enforcement turn
out to be complements. Finally, in presence of random returns, temptation and morality may
lead to two types of payo dominated choices: agents may give in to (payo dominated) tempting
choices, but they may also abstain from payo dominant (but morally sanctioned) opportunities.
The proposed framework therefore helps reconciling two empirical regularities, which cannot be
easily rationalized within available economic theories of crime: there are crimes which are not
committed, although their expected economic payo is clearly positive, and at the same time
there are crimes that are committed, although their expected return is clearly negative.
The related literature is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model which is analyzed
in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the role of the simplifying assumptions, the implications of
the analysis and some possible extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature a simple theory of temptation, prohibitions and moral
values. The modeling of temptation follows the approach of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), where
the cost of self-control is correctly anticipated and individual choices are time consistent.7
The theory focuses attention on the role of temptation and morality, which is essentially un-
explored in crime economics. The economic approach to crime, pioneered by Becker (1968), looks
at it as a rational choice, based on expected costs and benets. In an early and in
uential paper,
Ehrlich (1973) proposes to frame crime as a risky occupational choice, essentially driven by long
6This result hinges upon the idea that temptation depends on the dierence between static and dynamic
optimality, and that, when future punishment is contingent upon detection, a higher detection probability widens
this dierence.
7B enabou and Pycia (2002) show that Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) axiomatic approach can be interpreted in
terms of an internal con
ict between dierent selves along the lines of Thaler and Shefrin (1981). Internal con
icts
may also be represented by time inconsistent preferences, as in Strotz'(1955) seminal paper and in Laibson's (1997)
analysis of hyperbolic discounting. Benhabib and Bisin (2005) oer a neuroeconomics approach to temptation.
3run concerns. In this perspective temptation does not appear to be a crucial issue. Accord-
ingly, the subsequent crime economics literature based on this approach essentially disregards it.
Nonetheless, most prohibited or illegal actions are not performed by professional criminals and
temptation appears a relevant and widespread problem. In fact, in contrast to economists, crimi-
nologists have long considered temptation (and thus short run concerns) as one of the deep roots
of crime. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that `Nearly all crimes are mundane, simple, triv-
ial, easy acts aimed at satisfying desires of the moment [...] When [oenders'] desires con
ict with
[their] long term interests, those lacking self-control opt for the desires of the moment, whereas
those with greater self-control are governed by the restraints imposed by the consequences of acts
displeasing to family, friends and the law' (p. xv).8 While the traditional economic approach
to crime has greatly improved our understanding of the phenomenon, its neglect of the role of
temptation and morality may represent a limit for the empirical relevance of positive theories
(and, hence, for their normative implications).9 We propose a simple model of crime, which in-
corporates temptation-driven rational choices coupled with an analysis of the role of moral values
as self-control devices. The predictions of the model help reconcile rational economic theories of
crime with empirical stylized facts, which are puzzling for available theories. In particular, they
oer a natural explanation for the stylized fact that several crimes are not committed despite
having clearly positive expected returns, while many crimes are committed despite being clearly
payo dominated.10
8As we do here, they identify the roots of temptation in the fact that, `Whereas the pleasure attained by the
[criminal] act is direct, obvious and immediate, the pains risked by it are not obvious, or direct, and are in any
event at greater remove from it' (p. 95).
9Dills et al. (2008) conclude their critical assessment of the empirical literature making the point that economists
still `know little about the empirically relevant determinants of crime'. Approaches based on multiple equilibria,
such as those proposed by the literature on social determinants of crime, may provide part of the explanation.
Temptation and moral values may oer another, possibly complementary part.
10For example, calculating the expected return and punishment of tax evasion, Becker and Posner argue in their
blog, available at http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/11, that `if taxpayers responded only to the
expected cost of evading taxes, evasion would be far more widespread'. They argue that risk aversion does not
appear sucient to explain these observations, which may rather be imputed to the fact that `most people do
not believe it is moral to steal money even when there is little chance they will be found out'. Coricelli et al.
(2007) provide experimental evidence that induced shame on evaders does, indeed, favor compliance. Concerning
the observation of payo dominated crimes, we refer to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) for an extensive discussion
of several documented instances of seemingly irrational crimes committed by individuals facing temptation. Risk
4The paper also contributes to the literature studying the relationship between dierent types
of enforcement of prohibitions. Most of the attention in economics has been devoted to external
sanction mechanisms, whether legal (such as nes and jail) or social (such as stigma).11 In
contrast, we study the link between external and internal sanctions. To our knowledge, there are
no economic studies of the link between temptation, moral values and prohibitions. The model
predicts that stronger external punishment may increase the demand for moral values, since
they are likely to increase individual exposure to temptation. External sanctions may therefore
also increase the demand for \stricter" moral values of honesty. In particular, being externally
imposed, social sanctions may be a source of temptation. The model therefore also predicts that
agents may have an incentive to internalize social norms.
Finally, the paper contributes to the recent literature studying the role of moral values by
explicitly modeling individual incentives to adhere to a potentially costly moral code. Moral
values are modeled as working through self-regulative emotions of guilt, which reduce utility in
case of deviation from morally appropriate standards of behavior.12 The works of Lindbeck,
Nyberg, and Weibull (1999) and Weibull and Villa (2005) study the role of internalized social
norms that change behavior by inducing guilt (and/or shame). These papers consider individuals
exogenously endowed with internalized social norms, where the utility cost of stigma depends on
the share of individuals behaving in line with the norm. Dierently from these works, we study
individual incentives to endogenously adhere to a system of moral values. Despite the dierent
focus, we share with Corneo and Jeanne (2009) the idea that adhering to a value system may be
aversion makes this latter evidence even harder to explain. In turn, a high exponential discount rate might
help explain it, but it would make it harder to explain the other evidence, that people sometimes refrain from
immediately protable crimes.
11Polinsky and Shavell (2000) review the economic theory of public enforcement of law. Posner (1997) discusses
the interplay between social norms and the law. Glaeser et al. (1996), Rasmusen (1996) and Weibull and Villa
(2005), among others, provide crime theories based on peer pressure, stigmatization and internalized social norms,
which emphasize the potential for multiple equilibria. Furuya (2002), Blume (2003) and Funk (2004) emphasize
how stigmatization may deter crime, but also raise recidivism of those stigmatized.
12This approach essentially follows the literature in Social Psychology. According to Crocker and Park (2003)
moral values are eective in changing individual actions by inducing the immediate experience of self-regulatory
emotions such as guilt or shame (which tend to reduce self-esteem) for behaviors which are not in line with moral
standards.
5a choice.13 In our model morality may increase individual utility even if it may be costly to its
carrier (in terms of guilt or of forgone payos).14 This individual incentive provides a rationale
for morality which is dierent from cooperation and externalities.15 Dal B o and Tervi o (2008)
provide a dynamic analysis of the endogenous evolution of moral capital in terms of self-image
about own moral \type". While we focus on morality as a partial commitment device, rather
than as an accumulated capital of self-image, we share with this paper the focus on prohibitions
and moral values. Finally, some recent works investigate the emergence and/or transmission
of dierent ethical or moral norms. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) explicitly study why parents
should seek to instill in their children work values which are sustained by guilt.16 While we
do not explicitly study the important issue of moral setters, our model provides predictions on
the dierential incentives to adhere to moral codes of honesty for individuals (or families) facing
dierent expected returns from legal and illegal options.
3 The model
Self-control preferences are represented in terms of an internal con
ict between a `commitment'
ranking, re
ecting preferences under the possibility of commitment, and a `temptation' ranking,
re
ecting immediate urges at the moment of action, which may induce payo dominated choices
(according to the `commitment' ranking). Temptation may be resisted, but only at a cost of self-
control. The decision process is represented in terms of a planning and an action stage. When
evaluating things `coldly' at the planning stage an individual knows that his interests are best
served by a given choice, namely the one that maximally satises his `commitment' ranking, but
that he might be tempted by a dierent choice, the one that is best for his `temptation' ranking.
13Dierently from them we are interested in temptation and moral values rather than symbolic values and
tolerance. As in their work, however, our costs of guilt can be interpreted as a reduction in self-esteem.
14 In a related way, Rotemberg (1994) asks why individuals would choose to be altruistic towards colleagues,
when altruism is potentially costly. While his answer is based on strategic complementarity, ours is rooted in an
individual decision problem, with temptation and self-control.
15 Moral values enhance cooperation in Frank (1987) and Tabellini (2008), among others. Dal B o and Dal B o
(2009) provides experimental evidence for the eects of moral suasion on cooperation. In Kaplow and Shavell
(2007) moral values are welfare improving in presence of externalities.
16Tabellini (2008) studies the adoption and transmission of values of pro-social behavior and values of generalized
morality in a cultural transmission framework  a la Bisin and Verdier (2001).
6At the planning stage he may therefore look for commitment devices, that is, restrictions in his
action stage choice set, which exclude or at least make more costly tempting options.17
3.1 Self control preferences
Formally, consider a rational individual with self-control preferences, as axiomatically character-
ized by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).18 Such individual is otherwise standard, but for the fact that
he may be subject to temptation. The internal con
ict is re
ected in two dierent rankings of
expected outcomes, captured by two dierent continuous and linear (expected) utility functions,
representing commitment and temptation utility, and denoted u :  ! R and v :  ! R,
respectively, where  is the set of all possible probability distributions over outcomes. Given
a compact subset A  , which represents an action stage choice set, the cost of self-control
associated to one of its elements, x 2 A, is assumed to be equal to the distance between x and
the most tempting alternative (in A), in the temptation utility space: [maxy2A v(y)   v(x)]. The
expected utility associated to x 2 A is simply the dierence between its commitment utility and








At the action stage the agent chooses an element x 2 A to maximize (1). Anticipating this, at
the planning stage he chooses a compact subset A   to maximize his (self-control) preferences
(dened over the set of compact subsets of ), which are represented by the (indirect) utility
17Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) propose the example of a vegetarian restaurant chosen (at the planning stage) to
avoid temptation to eat meat (at the action stage). The choice of the restaurant works as a partial commitment
device for the agent by restricting his (action stage) choice set. Since a menu contains more than one possible
meal, such commitment is only partial. It would be full if the chosen menu contained only one meal (a singleton
choice set).
18These are preferences over sets of alternatives, satisfying a number of standard axioms (completeness, transi-
tivity, continuity and independence), plus a `set betweennes' axiom. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) show that these
axioms are characterized by a representation in terms of commitment and temptation ranking. Agents facing,
and resisting, temptation sustain self-control costs. Restricting their choice set by eliminating suboptimal (but
tempting) options makes them strictly better o. Self-control preferences therefore naturally generate a demand
for commitment devices.
19Under full commitment, that is if A = fxg, this cost is absent: the expected utility associated to x 2 fxg is












3.2 Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral Values
Consider an individual who at the action stage has to choose between two actions. These actions
dier in terms of their returns as well as for the fact that one is prohibited and externally
sanctioned. We call the rst action legal and the second one illegal (or criminal). At the planning
stage, the agent has to choose between adhering and rejecting a (received) moral code, which
condemns the prohibited action. The (action stage) choice set in case of adherence and rejection
is denoted by A and A0, respectively. Given either choice set, by choosing to commit crime with
probability a 2 [0;1] the agent uniquely selects a probability distribution over outcomes. The
set of outcomes includes returns to each action (say, monetary returns), together with external
and moral sanctions. To simplify the exposition, we develop our discussion under the benchmark
assumption of a linear and additive separable utility formulation.20 The commitment utility
associated to a probability distribution x 2  over outcomes is given by
u(x) = r(x) +  (x) + (x); (3)
where r(x); (x) and (x) are the expected values of (monetary) returns, external punishment
and moral sanction, respectively. Whenever it is not confusing, with a slight abuse of notation
we write u(a) to indicate u(x(a;Ai)), and analogously for r(a); (a) and (a), where a is the
probability to commit crime and x(a;Ai) is the probability distribution over outcomes implied
by a, given Ai, for i 2 f0;g.
Independently of the choice set, the expected return to committing crime with probability a
is r(a) = arc + (1   a)rw, where rw and rc denote returns to the legal and the illegal activity,
respectively. External sanctions are conditional upon having committed a crime (and having
been detected and punished). Let  be the expected external punishment for a criminal activity,
so that  (a) = a, independently of the choice set. Moral sanctions are also conditional upon
having committed a crime, but dier from externally enforced sanctions in that they do not
require external detection. For those who adhere to the received moral code (i.e., given A),
20In Section 5 we discuss a more general utility formulation: the main predictions hold even in presence of risk
aversion and of interactions between external and internal sanctions.
8moral sanctions attach a utility cost  > 0 to the choice of crime; for those who rejected the
received morality (i.e., given A0), such cost is absent. This implies that (x(a;A)) = a and
(x(a;A0)) = 0.
The temptation ranking diers from the commitment ranking for an underestimation of the
disutility from external punishment,
v (x) = r(x) +  (x) + (x) (4)
where  2 [0;1], parameterizes the exposure to self-control problems. The lower is  the lower
the weight attached to punishment in the temptation ranking and the more serious is the under-
estimation of the costs of crime.21
The main dierence between external and moral punishment for mis-behavior is assumed to
rely on the asymmetric under-evaluation of the two types of punishment. This modeling strategy
appears reasonable in view of the fact that external punishment is typically deferred in time. By
contrast, the moral feeling of guilt may be experienced immediately upon act, and even upon
desire. The assumption that moral costs enter in both the commitment and temptation ranking
is crucial for our argument. The fact that they enter exactly in the same way is not important,
but it allows a clear understanding of their eects even under the assumption of separable utility.
4 Equilibrium
Let us start from a standard case, in which there are neither temptation nor moral values. Let
r  rc   rw ? 0 be the (gross) utility premium to crime. The net premium is therefore (r   ).
In the absence of temptation, the optimal choice involves the maximization of the commitment
utility, so that legality is chosen whenever r < . Crime is optimal only when the crime premium
more than compensates the expected punishment. Notice that, absent temptation, nobody would
have an incentive to adhere to a sanctioning moral code, since this simply shifts the utility frontier
inwards.
21It would be immediate to explicit a time structure, in which external punishment is delayed in time. If  is
the discount factor in the commitment utility, temptation due to under-evaluation of future costs is expressed by
a discount factor T =  in the temptation ranking. Let p be the severity of external punishment and d the
detection probability. We would then have, for a moral individual, u(1) = rc   dp and v(1) = rc   Tdp,
which equivalent to our model with  = dp.
94.1 Action Choices in the Presence and Absence of Morality.
Let us rst consider temptation in the absence of moral values. Given A0, the commitment and
temptation utility are given by u(a) = (1   a)rw + a(rc   ) and v(a) = (1   a)rw + a(rc   ),
respectively. It is immediate to show (the formal proof is postponed) that there is a threshold
level of crime premium discriminating legality and crime. Around this threshold, there is an
intermediate range of crime premia, in which legality is optimal for the commitment ranking, but
crime is tempting. Within this range, the cost of self-control is increasing in the crime premium,
so that below the threshold temptation is resisted, but above the threshold the cost of self-control
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Figure 1: Ranges of temptation, self-control and legality as function of the crime premium.
Figure 2 depicts the commitment and temptation utility of crime, u(1) and v(1), as well as the
indirect utility U(A0) (the bold line), as a function of r.22 For low levels of the crime premium,
r < , legality represents the best option according to both rankings, since v (1) < v (0) and
u(1) < u(0), so that agents do not suer from temptation and their indirect utility is independent
of r. Symmetrically, when the crime premium is large enough, r > , crime is the rational choice
for both rankings and the indirect utility keeps increasing with r. In the intermediate range
r 2 [;] agents suer from temptation, however. In this range u(1) < u(0) = v (0) < v (1):
legality is optimal for the commitment ranking, but crime is optimal for the temptation ranking.
The cost of self-control is given by v (1)   v (0) = r   . In this `temptation range', r 2 [;],
the indirect utility is decreasing in r as long as temptation is resisted, but increasing in r when
22 For illustration it normalizes rw = 0, so that u(0) = v (0) = 0 and r = rc. Notice that, since the only
dierence between u and v is an under-evaluation of the external punishment, it always holds that v (1)  u(1).





























































Figure 2: Indirect utility as function of the crime premium, absent moral values.
crime is chosen. The threshold discriminating between crime and legality is r = (1 + )=2.
Let us now consider an individual who, at the action stage, is endowed with moral values of
legality. Given A, the commitment and temptation utility are now given by u(a) = (1   a)rw +
a(rc      ) and v(a) = (1   a)rw + a(rc      ), respectively. Notice that in both rankings
the expected utility from crime is reduced by the moral punishment. This shifts by  the relevant
thresholds, as stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. (Temptation and self-control) Let A be given, with   0.
 Legality is optimal for both the commitment and temptation rankings, u and v, and the agent
is not subject to temptation, if r <  + ;
 Legality delivers the largest commitment utility, u(0) > u(1), but crime is tempting, v (0) <
v (1), if r 2 [ + ; + ]. In this range:
{ Temptation is resisted, but at a self-control cost (r      ), if r 2 ( + ;(1 +
)=2 + );
{ Temptation is overwhelming and crime (the option with the lowest commitment utility)
is chosen, if r 2 ((1 + )=2 + ; + ];23
 Crime is optimal for both commitment and temptation rankings, u and v, and the agent is
not subject to temptation, if r >  + .
23If r =
(1+)
2 + , then crime and legality are indierent.




maxb2[0;1] v(b)   v(a)
	
, whose
solution is equivalent to maxa2[0;1] fu(a) + v(a)g, which implies (leaving aside indierence) that:
a
 = 1 () u(1) + v (1) > u(0) + v (0)
Notice that u(1) > u(0) () r >  +  and v(1) > v(0) () r >  + . Moreover, if
r 2 [ + ; + ], then u(1) + v(1) > u(0) + v(0) () r > (1 + )=2 + :
Corollary 1. (Equilibrium choices at the action stage) Given A, with   0, crime is
chosen for r > (1 + )=2 +  and legality is chosen below this threshold.
Remark 1. (Action stage in presence and absence of moral values) The analysis in
the absence of moral values, that is, given A0, is formally identical to that with moral values for
 = 0.
The eects of the crime premium r on temptation, self-control and optimal choices have
already been discussed. Let us now consider the eects of the other parameters. An increase in
the expected external punishment  has three eects: rst, it reduces the range of crime (Corollary
1); second, it increases the length of the temptation range, (1 ): this comes from the fact that
the dierence between u and v is due to an under-evaluation of  in the latter (Proposition 1);
third, a marginal increase in the expected punishment  reduces the indirect utility of all agents
choosing crime, whereas it raises the indirect utility of agents resisting temptation since it reduces
the costs of self-control which are given by v(1)   v(0) = (r      ). Finally, a reduction in 
increases the ranges of both temptation and crime, as well as the costs of self-control. Since the
eect of the moral cost on indirect utility is what drives adherence or rejection of moral values,
we discuss it in the context of the planning stage.
4.2 Planning stage: Moral values as Partial Commitment
A moral cost attached to crime makes it a less attractive option and shifts the range of temptation
to a higher interval of crime premia. In particular, from Corollary 1, morality triggers legality
for r 2 ((1 + )=2;(1 + )=2 + ), since for crime premia in this range, an individual without
moral values would choose crime, whereas one with moral values would choose legality.24 From
24In fact, for any crime premium, there exists a suciently large , such that legality would be chosen (by a
moral individual).
12Proposition 1, all moral agents in the range r 2 ((1 + )=2 + ; + ] give in to temptation and
choose illegal activities, which are payo dominated according to the commitment ranking. The
existence of a moral cost  reduces the range in which these payo dominated prohibited choices
are made. But if the level of  is large enough, even agents for whom it would be optimal to
choose crime in the absence of moral values may choose legal activities which are payo dominated
according to the commitment ranking u. Consequently, being moral does not necessarily represent
the best option at the planning stage, since morality involves both costs and benets. While 
monotonically shrinks the range of crime premia for which a moral individual chooses crime, its
eect on indirect utility may be non monotonic. From (2) and Proposition 1, the indirect utility
U(A) for an individual who embraced moral values is given by
U(A) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
rw if r <  + 
rw   [rc   rw      ] if r 2 ( + ;(1 + )=2 + )
rc       if r > (1 + )=2 + 
Figure 3 depicts the indirect utility U(A) as a function of  for (moral) individuals with
dierent legal returns rw, for given levels of rc; and .
Consider an agent with rw = r1
w, so that is crime premium is large, r > . In the absence of
moral values ( = 0), this individual faces no temptation and chooses crime. As  increases, he
starts feeling guilty, but as long as  < r , the moral cost does not change the optimality of crime
for both rankings. If  > r , then crime is not optimal for u, but as long as  2 (r ;r ),
it is still optimal for v, so that our individual faces temptation. Notice that now it is precisely
the moral prohibition of crime that creates temptation. Resisting temptation would involve a
cost of self-control given by (r    ). For any  2 (r   ;r   (1 + )=2), self-control is still
too costly, and our individual gives in to temptation and keeps choosing crime. Accordingly, in
this range an increase in the strength of moral values  leads to a reduction in indirect utility,
since it raises the costs associated to the experience of guilt. For  2 (r   (1 + )=2;r   ),
the cost of self-control is low enough and the individual resists temptation and chooses legality;
the cost of guilt disappears and the cost of self-control keeps decreasing in , so that in this range
U(A) is increasing in . Finally, for  > r , crime stops being tempting and the self-control





























































Figure 3: Indirect utility as function of , for dierent crime premia.
Consider now agents with higher legal returns, rw = r2
w, so that r 2 ((1 + )=2;). While
the indirect utility is qualitatively analogous to the previous case, such agent would give in to
temptation if  = 0. Yet his indirect utility is highest when the strength of moral values is
large enough to eliminate temptation and let him abstain from crime. If rw = r3
w, so that
r 2 (;(1 + )=2), then even with  = 0 the agent exerts self control and resists temptation.
Since morality reduces the costs of self-control, the indirect utility of this agent is monotonically
increasing in . Finally, an agent with rw = r4
w, so that the crime premium is suciently low,
r < , always chooses the legal option and never faces temptation and the indirect utility is
independent of .
Notice that moral values involve two types of costs. In the rst place, if moral values are
weak (if  is low), they may be insucient to induce an agent to resist temptations. In this
case, not only the agent commits crimes which are sub-optimal from the point of view of the
commitment ranking, but he also pays a disutility cost associated to the experience of guilt for
14behaving against his morality. A second type of cost arises if a moral agent refrains from illegal
actions, which would be optimal for the commitment ranking in the absence of morality. These
costs of forgone payos are traded o with the increase in expected utility due to the reduction in
the costs of self-control. As a result, not all agents necessarily gain from adherence to a system of
moral values which punish dishonesty and temptation. From the above analysis it is immediate
to characterize the planning stage choice between adhering to morality, A, and rejecting it, A0.25
Proposition 2. (Planning stage choice: moral values) For any given  > 0, the following
holds. An individual
 is indierent between A and A0, if r  ;
 prefers A if r 2 (;(1 + )=2);
 given r 2 ((1 + )=2;), prefers A if  > 2r   (1 + ) and A0 if  < 2r   (1 + );
 prefers A0 if r > .
To x ideas, we call individuals moral, amoral or immoral if U(A) is higher, equal or lower
than U(A0), respectively. Proposition 2, states that agents with a low enough (gross) crime
premium, r  , are amoral. For these agents both the expected costs and benets of morality
are zero since, irrespective of , they choose legality and do not face temptation. At the other
extreme, for agents with a large crime premium, r > , crime is the optimal choice in the absence
of morality. They are therefore immoral since morality only involves expected costs of either guilt
or forgone crime payos. For intermediate crime premia, r 2 (;), agents face temptation in
the absence of morality. Adhering to a moral code of honesty is benecial only if it allows to resist
temptation in equilibrium. Those who would resist temptation even in the absence of morality
strictly gain from any  > 0, thanks to lower costs of self control. This group of agents, with
r 2 (;(1 + )=2), is therefore moral for any  > 0. This is not true for those who, absent
morality, would give in to temptation. For them morality is benecial if and only if it induces to
choose legality. Weak moral values,  < 2r   (1 + ), are insucient to induce them to resist
temptation and only reduce expected utility. Thus agents facing strong temptations adhere to
moral values if and only if these are suciently strict for them to resist temptation in equilibrium,
that is,  > 2r   (1 + ).
25In what follows we focus on generic cases in the parameter space.
15Let us conclude by brie
y commenting on role of ,  and  for planning stage choice. Propo-
sition 2 has the following,











We refer to the interval in (5) as the morality range. Morality increases individual utility only
if it allows to resist temptation. Consequently, the set of r for which morality is preferred strictly
increases in  up to the point in which nobody is tempted, which is case for  = (1   ). For
larger values of  the morality range is given by r 2 (;). An increase in temptation due to
either a reduction in  or an increase in , expands it. Consequently, even if external and moral
punishment aect utility additively, an increase in external punishment increases the demand
for morality. This result may appear counterintuitive at rst sight. The intuition is, however,
straightforward once one considers that increased external punishments have two main eects.
On the one hand they reduce the returns to illegal activities and the equilibrium level of crime.
On the other hand they increase the range of temptation and this makes moral values of honesty
even more valuable from an individual perspective.
5 Discussion
We have considered a simple model in partial equilibrium with separable and linear preferences,
where prohibitions are subject to both external and internal sanctions. These assumptions allow
to illustrate the main predictions in the simplest way although the model can be generalized in
several directions or specialized for the study of problems with specic features. Let us now discuss
the role of the assumptions behind our results, some further implications and some extensions of
the analysis.
Actions and Desires. We considered moral values sanctioning both the action (`Thou Shalt
not Steal') and its `desire' (`Thou Shalt not Covet'). If morality sanctions actions but not desires,
then it involves only costs (of either guilt or foregone payos) but no benets, since it does not help
16reducing the costs of self-control.26 In this case A would never be preferred to A0. Conversely,
if the moral cost enters only in the temptation ranking, it is still true that agents prefer A to A0
if, and only if, morality allows to resist temptation.27 The main eect of punishing only desires
is to reduce the ecacy of morality, since a larger  is required to change behavior. Therefore,
while the qualitative predictions do not depend on the assumption that moral punishment is the
same in both rankings, they do require some moral sanction of temptation.
Risk aversion. The main change in considering separable but non-linear preferences is that
with risk aversion an increase in  expands the morality range because morality also plays an
insurance role.28 A higher expected external punishment still unambiguously reduces crime and
shifts the temptation range towards individuals with lower legal returns. It thus still reduces
the range of immoral individuals (those who strictly prefer to reject morality) and it expands
the range of amoral individuals (those who are indierent). Yet, under risk aversion, whether it
expands or shrinks the morality range depends on the dierent eect of marginal utility at the two
thresholds. Risk aversion does not aect the prediction that more serious temptation problems
due to a decrease in  raise crime and expand both the temptation and the morality range.
Non separable Preferences. External and internal punishment may complement or substitute
each other.29 For instance, one more year in jail may be harder if during that time the convicted
also feels guilty. Similarly, if there is a component of shame to the internal punishment, ending
up in jail, or being exposed to social stigma, might increase the cost of internal punishment by
adding shame to guilt. External and internal punishments may, nonetheless, also weaken each
other. For instance, being ned may reduce the feeling of guilt, since the agent may perceive that
he already pays enough for his mis-behavior.30 The precise form of interaction might therefore be
both individual and context dependent. As in the separable case stricter moral values increase the
26Graphically, the indirect utility represented in Figure 3 would have no increasing range.
27The only dierence is that if  enters only in v, individuals with high crime premia may have to exert self-
control to resist the temptation of becoming legal. This cannot happen when  also enters in u since guilt induces
legality when crime is still tempting.
28Risk aversion refers here to the fact that utility is a concave function of monetary payos. Of course, expected
utility is still a linear function of probabilities.
29To focus on interactions between external and internal punishment, we consider as a benchmark the case in
which the marginal utility of money is constant and it is either not aected or reduced by higher punishments
(whether external or internal).
30This is coherent with the ndings by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).
17incentives to be moral (i.e., a higher  expands the morality range and reduce the set of immoral
agents) and reduces crime. An increase in  expands the temptation range if internal and external
punishment reinforce each other, whereas it shrinks it if they weaken each other. The intuition is
that, since temptation is due to an under-evaluation of external punishment, the indirect eect of
morality on the temptation range has the same sign of the direct eect of external punishment in
the former case and the opposite sign in the latter. An increase in external punishment  (beyond
reducing crime) still expands the temptation range. Its eect on the morality range depends again
on whether external and internal punishment are complements or substitutes. Nonetheless, as in
the separable case the set of immoral agents (those that are strictly worse o by being moral)
is unambiguously reduced by an increase in . Finally, as in the separable case, a decrease in 
expands both the temptation and the morality range, beyond increasing crime.
Punishments and premia. We have restricted attention to external punishments for mis-
behavior but the logic of the analysis identically applies also to problems involving external
rewards, which, being related to external interventions and being delayed in time, can suer from
temptation problems as well. Considering moral rewards rather than punishments would qualify
the predictions in two main dimensions. First, since the indirect utility would be increasing in
 for those choosing the legal action, a large enough  would induce some agents which in the
current setting are immoral to become moral. Second, there would be no amoral individuals
(since those choosing legality strictly benet from the moral premium).31
Heterogenous Exposure to Temptation. We framed our analysis with reference to a single agent.
The analysis can be specialized to study the equilibrium choices of dierent individuals facing
e.g. dierent expected returns r or dierent levels of temptation . For example, agents might
face the same illegal return rc, but dierent legal returns rw. Interpreting the results in terms
of socio-economic classes, the rich would be amoral (since they expect to face less temptations),
while the poor would be immoral (since illegality represents for them the payo dominant option).
Middle class individuals have the largest exposure to temptation, since they face the largest risk of
indulging in payo dominated illegal actions, and therefore, have the largest incentives to adhere
31This case appears of limited interest, however, since in this formulation there are no utility costs of morality
which is therefore a `free lunch'. In particular, and trivially, if  = 1, then all agents would be moral, legal and
happy.
18to moral values of honesty.32 In the same logic, since the model also predicts that the stronger
the temptation the larger the level of  required to embrace morality, the lower middle classes
are expected to display a stricter morality. Similarly, dierent agents may face dierent exposure
to temptation problems in terms of . For example, if teen-agers face larger temptation problems
than adults, they would give in more frequently to payo dominated illegal actions. They would
also benet more from a system of strict moral values compared to adults.
Social interactions. We have developed the analysis in a partial equilibrium setting. This
is done to focus attention on the role of moral values as an individual self-control device. The
framework can be easily extended to study the role of morality in presence of social interactions,
which are likely to in
uence individual choices in terms of crime premia, external punishment and
moral sanctions. In fact, in most of the studies cited in Section 2, the rationale for morality relates
to general equilibrium eects or externalities. In general equilibrium, the endogenous choice of
morality may lead to the emergence of multiple equilibria due to strategic complementarities.
Recall that in equilibrium a larger  increases the morality range, which, with heterogeneous
agents, determines the share of moral individuals. If, for instance, the cost of guilt  increases
with the share of moral individuals, then we can observe multiple equilibria.33 This possibility is
illustrated in Figure 4, which plots the equilibrium share of moral agents, denoted by (;0), as
an increasing function of , for a given level of expected external punishment 0. It also plots,
a (reduced form linear) function, denoted by (), that links the strength of moral values to the
equilibrium share of moral individuals.34
32If the rich have access to better illegal opportunities, rw and rc may be positively correlated. In this case also
the rich may face temptation and have larger incentives to be moral. It remains true that it is individuals with
intermediate crime premia who face temptation.
33This essentially amounts to consider also a component of shame related to social norms. As in Weibull and
Villa (2005), the model yields a unique equilibrium if the utility cost associated to moral values (the degree to
which they generate guilt) is exogenous, whereas multiple equilibria are possible when it is endogenously related
to the share of (moral) compliers. In such case, social norms eectiveness and crime rates are jointly determined
in equilibrium.
34As shown above the share of moral individuals in equilibrium increases until the previously characterized
threshold and stabilize afterwards. Concerning the link from  to , we simply postulate a linear relationship
in our illustration, which delivers two corner equilibria (with shares of moral individuals equal to zero or the



























Figure 4: Social interactions and multiple equilibria.
An interesting implication of the existence of multiple equilibria is that the interaction between
external and internal punishments may lead to the disappearance of equilibria with high morality
and little equilibrium crime. From the previous analysis we know that a reduction in expected
external punishment from 0 to 1 < 0 tends to reduce the incentives to acquire morality. This
is represented in Figure 4 by a downwards shift in the locus representing the equilibrium share of
moral individuals, (;1). Notice that if the reduction in  is large enough, the multiplicity of
equilibria may vanish and the only equilibrium is characterized by  = 0 and  = 0. This stylized
example illustrates the more general point that, in the presence of multiple equilibria induced
by social interactions, even small variation in external punishment may lead to relatively large
changes in the equilibrium levels of crime and morality.35
Instilling Moral Values. In our analysis we have limited attention to the eect of morality, and
its strength, on the individual utility. We did not explicitly investigate the process of emergence
and/or transmission of moral values. As in the papers discussed in Section 2, moral education
is generally performed by parents and other norms setters. The analysis provides a rationale for
altruistic parents to instill moral values in their children in the face of expected future temptations.
In this respect, the theory predicts that the optimal level of moral education should depend on
parents' expectation about the level of temptation that will be faced by their children. For
35Similarly one could consider general equilibrium eects in terms of external detection which are likely to be
related to the share of criminals, as in Sah (1991).
20example if parents expect their children to face some temptation they may optimally inculcate
moral values. The model points out, however, that the choice of morality may be a dicult
one for those parents that expect their children to be exposed to "large" temptations since they
must successfully inculcate very strict moral values in order to change their children's behavior.
Providing a moral education is a risky strategy, however, since failure to resist temptation exposes
children to the costs of both foregone payos and guilt. The choice by parents may also involve
costs for instilling moral values, which, presumably, are increasing with the targeted level of their
`strictness'. This would lead to large discontinuities in term of choices of moral education, since
in the face of an increasing temptations the optimal moral education requires either instilling a
stricter morality or a no morality at all.36 This also implies that increasing exposure to temptation
(which could also be induced by e.g. stricter external enforcement) may lead to more `morally
polarized' societies: for individuals it is optimal to either completely give up on morality or to
adhere to even stricter moral codes.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a simple theoretical framework studying the relationship between prohibitions,
temptation and moral values. In presence of temptation, moral values sanctioning both actions
and desires may alleviate self-control problems and work as partial commitment devices. The
model allows to investigate several interesting issues like the relationship between morality and
temptation, the individual incentives to adhere to potentially costly moral codes of behavior,
the distribution of these incentives across the population and the interactions between external
and internal sanctions in determining behavior and morality. Applied to crime economics, it
highlights the so far overlooked role of temptation and morality, incorporating them into a rational
theory of crime. This provides a natural explanation for two puzzling stylized facts: some crimes
are not committed although their expected economic payo is clearly positive while others are
committed although their expected return is clearly negative. The framework may be applied
more generally to all situation in which external sanctions may give rise to temptation, however.
Given its simplicity, it can also be extended to the consideration of general equilibrium eects and
36This can be seen by a simple comparative statics exercise which focus attention to the agents at the lower
bound of the morality range studied in Section 4.
21specialized to study economic problems involving externally sanctioned, although not necessarily
illegal, prohibitions.
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